The West
When one wishes to characterize the civilization of the Middle East, one assumes that it is a direct continuation of the former civilizations of Egypt, Mesopotamia, Syria, Iran, etc. It is also assumed that the traits of the present civilization were inherited from earlier times, either as a direct result of an identical environment or by way of the impact of earlier civilizations, handed down by cultural transmission.
Such an assumption is not possible with the civilization of the West. Europe is supposed to have had one earlier civilization, that of the classical world. Even if that were entirely so, there are a number of problems with that particular assumption:
- the area of the present Western civilization is not identical with that of the Classical civilization.
- some of the areas which previously belonged to Classical Civilization now form parts of Orthodox civilization (the Balkans) or of Islamic civilization in the eastern and southern littoral of the Mediterranean.
As there is no direct correspondence between the territories of Classical Civilization and the European area of Western civilization, the present behavioral patterns of Western civilization should be examined in a different way. Samuel P. Huntington defined present Western civilization as having:1
- Classical legacy - including Greek philosophy and rationalism, Roman law, Latin language and Christianity.
- Western Christianity - Catholic and Protestant versions.
- European languages - no single core language.
- Separation of authorities - Separate spiritual and temporal authorities, God and Caesar, church and state, duality in western culture.
- Rule of law - Concept of centrality of law to civilized existence.
- Social pluralities - civil society.
- Representative bodies, corporations, etc.
- Individualism.
Huntington also quoted Matthew Melko: The Nature of Civilizations2 as to the nature of Western civilization:
- Western civilization is a new species, in a class by itself, incomparably different from all other civilizations that have ever existed.
- Its worldwide expansion threatens (or promises) to end the possibility of development of all other civilizations.
The first statement is obviously correct, with the second there are is some difficulty. If the rule that identical civilizations must have identical climatic conditions is accepted, then it is impossible to imagine two identical civilizations in separate territories. This is certainly correct, so Western civilization can exist only in Western Europe. Those areas with temperate climate, similar to Western Europe, settled by people of European extractions, can have civilizations very similar to that of Western Europe, but never identical. However, the civilizations of the areas with temperate climates, settled by Europeans, like North America, the southern area of South America, Australia and New Zealand, are so near to their origin that for practical purposes they can be considered parts of Western civilization.
The uniqueness of Western civilization is not entirely a derivative of previous civilizations. Still, it exists and has unique qualities. It should be analyzed to find how its present attributes have developed.
It must be added here that uniqueness does not necessarily mean uniquely good or bad. Indeed, the expressions good or bad have no place in history. There are no universally accepted ethical measurements against which a civilization can be judged. Furthermore, each civilization is unique, in the sense that each reflects the environment in which it is located.
One can probably speak of a fortunate location of Europe in the context of the last climatic revolution. The unique circumstances of the climatic revolution gave Europe a better climate, richer land, short enough distance to the centers of the emerging Urban Civilizations to gain the benefits and far enough to escape their worst aspects 3 Probably the proper expression for European civilization in the context of the world as it is now is lucky. Before the last climatic change that adjective would not have been suitable.
When the Middle East already had Empires, standing armies and predatory expeditions, on the Ionian islands and on the Greek mainland the inhabitants built the first small Mycenaean towns. When in the Fertile Crescent they built pyramids, hanging gardens and irrigation canals, in Europe they built villages on piles driven into Swiss lakes, and around the Danube and its tributaries.
The development of Europe was in considerable contrast to the Middle East. Instead of centralized and organized religions, Europeans had fertility rites, which later evolved into the Greek religion. The thousands of Venus figures and masked gods are silent witnesses to these rites.
It is not known whether Europeans were even aware of the large Empires in the Middle East. In Greece and on the Ionian islands they were in contact with them, but they were confident that the distance, the sea and their ships could protect them. Indeed, until the establishment of the Persian Empire, these were sufficient.
In the meantime, agriculture spread to the whole of Europe, but without urban civilization. Simply, population density was not sufficient for the development of urban centers. Urban civilization reached the south of the continent at the end of the Second Millennium BC and Western Europe only at the end of the First Millennium BC.4
The peoples on the European continent first came into conflict with the eastern Empires in the middle of the First Millennium BC. It was not a chance encounter. The attack was carefully planned and orchestrated by the Persians. It began with a concentrated naval attack by Carthage and Etruria against the Greek colonies in the Western Mediterranean, followed by a Persian attack against the Greek mainland and its colonies in Asia Minor.
The Persian attack was repulsed by a brilliant technical maneuver. It consisted of teaching the Greek hoplites to march in step and execute tactical movements on command.5 It was a clever solution, the first but not the last tactical innovation the West used to save itself from the overwhelming numerical superiority of the East. Anyone who has ever done military service, has to thank the Greeks for the long hours spent doing field drill and the tradition of starting a march on the left foot. Both are inherited from the Greeks fighting the Persians.
Eventually the technical superiority of the Greeks became so obvious that they turned into the primary supplier of mercenary troops to the Oriental Empires. The Anabasis of Xenophon is probably the best testimony written about it. It is the story of a mercenary army, with 10,000 Greek hoplites, which lost its employer, sets out from the middle of Mesopotamia to reach the Black Sea. On their way to the sea, they move through hostile territory without anyone in their way able to hinder them. No doubt, prospective employers and opponents read that book.
As the desiccation continued moving north, so did the agriculture and the center of Europe. The political center of Europe started in Crete, then it moved to the mainland, from there to Rome. In the 3rg Century AD it moved to Milan and from there again to the north.
Until the middle of the 5th Century AD Europe was divided into two. This division gave us the separation of Catholicism and Protestantism, and also some of the most important of the West's behavioral traits. The division lay along the line of the Rhine and Danube, from the North Sea to the Black Sea. West and South of that line was the Roman Empire, an organized urban civilization. It was far from the authoritative regimes of the East, but it was learning fast.
North and east of the line were independent German tribes. They were not completely uncivilized, they had a social structure and a recognized religion. Most of the tribes had some form of assembly in which freeborn members of the tribe could participate.
There was near-continuous warfare between the Roman Empire and the German tribes since the repulse of the Cimbri and Teutoni by Marius. There was a constant pattern to this warfare. One or more German tribes crossed the river, pillaging the country beyond, until driven back by the mobile Roman reserves. As the Romans still had the expertise of keeping in step, and the Germans were still brave as they were, but unorganized, the result was usually the same. The Germans were cut to pieces and pushed back. Eventually the time came, when the Roman reserves gave out, and that was the end of the Empire.
When the defense line along the rivers was finally broken, there were two kinds of German tribes. There were those tribes who were in direct contact with the Romans. Indeed, those tribes were conglomerates of remainders of tribes destroyed by the Romans, and those east of them who had no contact with Rome yet.
Among the west German tribes were the Franks, Alemans , Bavarians, earlier known as the Quadi and Marcomanni, the Thuringians and the Langobards. The most important eastern tribes were the Burgundians, Vandals, the Goths, both the Visigoths and the Ostrogoths, and other smaller tribes. Judging from their names, they originated in the Scandinavian Peninsula, crossed the Baltic and established themselves in the south of Russia, north of the Black Sea. From there they turned west. It was a common pattern, continued until the establishment of the first Russian State, also by Scandinavian visitors.
After the end of the Western Roman Empire there was a Europe led but not peopled by Germans and Scandinavians. The original Celtic and Roman, or Romanized, populations were still in place The Germans and the Scandinavians were the ruling elite, the aristocracy, but the original population remained, and the language was some dialect of Latin. North and east of the river line the people were Germans and the language was one of the dialects of the German language.
This was the Europe that was to become the parent of the present Western civilization. There are two distinct sources. One is the heritage of the classical civilization of the Roman Empire, and the second the traditions of a free and barely civilized people from the forests of the northern and eastern Europe.
Richness of the Land
To characterize Europe in one word, it is 'rich', and the one word for the Middle East would be 'poor'. There is nothing innate about the relative richness of the two areas. If one wanted to characterize the two areas before the last climatic change, then Europe would be characterized as 'arctic wasteland' and the Middle East as 'rich parkland'. However, about 11,500 years ago there was a climatic change and until the next climatic change we have to look at things as they are.
The figures in Appendix I show the comparable wealth of the two areas. The figures reflect the basic wealth of the areas, in part directly and in part indirectly. The agricultural richness of Europe directly affects the figures, just as does the mineral wealth of the Middle East. However, the figures are negligible by contrast with the indirect influence. One can relate the richness of agriculture to the richness of land but there is also a direct connection between the richness of the land and educational level and high-tech industries.
Even in late historical times Europe was covered by dense forest. The tree cover gave a sense of security to Europeans just as the desert gave a sense of insecurity to those from the Middle East. It is correct that forest conceals and desert reveals. The desert caused the people of the Middle East to flee to the security and safety of their families. The forests of Europe caused the opposite.
People in the Middle East are part of their families, people in Europe are individualists. It is not that family in Europe had no importance. It had and has. In classical times, in Rome and in Greece, the extended family had major importance, but no more than that. There was always a limit upon the importance of the family. It is difficult to imagine that a Western ruler would emulate Yahya ibn Khalid, the Persian vizier of Harun ar-Rashid who placed twenty-five of his sons in important military and civilian offices. Western rulers did everything to ensure family succession, but also knew that rulers need political allies and supporters. So, family was important but not of crucial importance
Forests give security, security creates individualism, and the individualism and security ensure wealth too. In modern times, the wealth of North America is proverbial. People who received an allocation of land somewhere in the forests of North America, knew that with the help of a pick and axe, one could clear a plot, build a house with the logs cleared from the plot, and given time and patience, possessed a productive farm, beyond anything that was possible in the old country.6 At that time, productive lands in Europe were already occupied by others, or were given over to more profitable sheep ranging, as in Scotland. The first farmers in Europe might have cleared the land in the same way.7 Judging from the archeological remains, there was enough land for everyone. The early villages of the Danubian settlements had raised no defenses against human enemies. They had palisades or ditches against wild animals, but not against humans. They also seemed to have some sort of primitive equality. No sign of palaces among hovels, they had houses of similar size.
The rich land of Europe had tremendous powers of recovery. There were endless wars and the continent always quickly recuperated. The secret lay in the richness of the land. During the Thirty Years War Germany was devastated, the peasants were decimated, but after the end of the war, the countryside of Germany swiftly recovered.8 Much more swiftly than the people. But there is no need to go so far back. During the Second World War, Germany and most of Central Europe was thoroughly devastated, probably even more than during the Thirty Years War. Still, after a short period, Europe did not starve but had serious problems with lakes of milk and mountains of butter. The land always was, and still is so fruitful that a reduction in the numbers of farmers does not reduce the surplus.
In addition to the individualism of Europeans, there are a number of additional effects, indirectly caused by the richness of the land.
The staple of Europe is wheat and bread.9 Wheat is an expensive crop to grow. It requires annual rotation of fields or letting a field lie fallow every alternate year. Rotation of fields means that every alternate year something should be planted which does not exploit the fields too much and which enriches it by plowing in nitrogen-rich roots. The most suitable crop for this purpose is clover or similar crops that are suitable for animal feed. Indeed, the best rotation technique is to sow the land in alternate years with something which can be used as a fodder, e.g. drive the cattle or the pigs on the field and utilize the animal droppings as fertilizer, in addition to the nitrogen-rich roots which are plowed back into the field.
This type of agriculture had a number of important results. The first was that Europeans had animal protein in their diet. This in comparison with the protein-poor vegetable diet of the slaves of the 'hydraulic civilizations'. Henri IV could say that he wants two chickens in every French pot on Sundays, and that after a long and bitter civil war. There is no corresponding saying remembered from any Middle Eastern ruler, but then Middle Eastern rulers are not known for their solicitude for their subjects' diet.
The second result was that the demographic pressure was much less in Europe than in the Middle East and the Far East. The higher demographic pressure in the latter areas, of course, resulted in the fields being more heavily exploited than in Europe and so food production was higher. It was indeed a vicious circle, more food meant more mouths, which needed even more food. One of the results of the population explosion in the Far East was that despite the very promising start of scientific development, far ahead of anything the West could have displayed at that time, there was no continuation.
Because of the demographic explosion, manpower in the East was very cheap. Cheap manpower took away the economic justification for technological and scientific innovations. Necessity is the mother of invention. If there is no necessity, there are no inventions. The wealth of Europe, the lack of population pressure contributed to the scientific and technological advancement of Europe, which eventually led to its world domination. Until the time of the Renaissance, Europe was not densely populated. In the twelfth - thirteenth centuries AD there were still empty areas in Eastern Europe for the German expansion to the East. The same low demographic density and the spread of the plague, the Black Death in the 14th Century AD caused an economic crisis with the rising wages and the expectations of the lower classes.
The wealth of Europe influenced its religious affiliation too. It is true that Europe is Christian; it is Catholic in those areas which were part of the Western Roman Empire and Protestant in those areas which were outside it. Christianity is an offshoot of Judaism, having begun as one of its reform movements. Judaism is the first monotheistic religion, e.g. a religion of the desert. It would be inconceivable that rich Europe would adopt a religion of the desert, full of restrictions and self-lacerations, as it was adopted in the Middle East. Christianity, in its European Catholic format, is nearer to the synthesis of religions of the Mother and the Father, agriculture and husbandry.
European Christianity is far from Middle Eastern Monophysite and Nestorian churches, and even further from the original Judaistic sects, the Ebionites, Elcharaisites and the Docetists. Among others, none of the Eastern Christian sects accepted the Trinity, the adoration of the Virgin and cults of the Saints with their copious iconography. When the first Portuguese landed in Goa in India, they met local Christians there who were converted by Nestorian missionaries in the 4th Century AD The local Christians refused to accept the Portuguese as Christians; they saw idolaters in them.
Middle Eastern monotheistic religions put restrictions on their adherents. Even the most liberal of the monotheistic religions, Islam, places a small number of restrictions on its believers, Judaism places many more. Christianity alone, in its European format, has no restrictions. It seems that it is difficult to put restrictions on the rich.
Europe inherited wealth from the last climatic change, just as the Middle East inherited poverty. These are facts and not opinions. One can argue about later developments on both sides, but the plain and sorry fact is that the endless feud is a conflict between two halves of a people, who at least have common origins, and that this feud was caused because of a climatic fluke.
Memories of Early Times
Eastern civilization inherited its behavioral patterns from its predecessors, the 'hydraulic civilizations' of the Middle East. The West also has behavioral patterns, and they were inherited from somewhere. However, the types of patterns are not identical. One of the most important elements in the present psychological setup of the East is the position of the individual only as a part of an extended family, or clan, without distinctive individual values.
In the West, belonging to a family is much less important. Therefore, instead of evaluating the role of family in society, the role of the individual in society is examined. The three titles, which are counterparts of the subjects examined for the East, with the exceptions of the attitude to family, are :
Rule of law
Search for liberty
Scientific curiosity
It goes without saying that all these subjects are derivatives of environmental circumstances. However, it is easier to show and grasp their origins by demonstrating them to be cultural derivatives, e.g. environmental origins once removed.
Rule of Law
It must be emphasized here that human nature is the same everywhere. In the East there were always absolute rulers, without restraint from their subjects, so much so that it became standard, with the slaves cheering their rulers. It must be accepted, however, painful, as it may seem that the eastern situation is not the aberration. If anything, the aberration lies in the West.
In the analysis of the nature of rule in the East, a number of criteria were defined:
- The power of the ruler is always absolute, without possible competing centers of authority.
- Religion is the main supporting pillar of the rule. The ruler is always God's representative on earth. It certainly was so in old times, but even in modern times, the most modern and secular regimes return to the comfort of religion in times of stress.
- Hatred of the West is the third pillar of Eastern rule. It was explained in detail in the chapter: The Nature of Rule, that it is not hatred created and motivated by central authority. It is a populist feeling, driven by deep-seated feelings of deprivation, compelling central authorities not less than being compelled by it in turn.
Western principles of rule are different:
- There is a law that is binding on the authority and on the people. The law does not have to be written or formal, tradition - mos maiorum - can be an effective law. In principle, the law is the real authority.
This principle was always effective. Nobody really argued against the centrality of law. The question of who sets the laws and who has the power to change them, was always the bone of contention. Even totalitarian dictators, like Hitler and Stalin, took good care to create laws to justify what they did or intended to do. Their opponents might have regarded those laws as sham, but they were laws and the sacred principle was maintained, at least on paper.
- Western concept of rule allows independent centers of power. Their existence is authorized and legal. In certain circumstances, the independent centers of authority can be armed bodies too. The concept of independent centers, should be explained.
The Western concept of rule accepts the possibility that there are fields that is beyond the domination of the central authority, and, therefore, abandoned them to individuals to act as they wish. Western society is full of organizations in every possible field whose membership is voluntary, acting according to by-laws drawn up by members of those organizations.The right of free association is one of the basic freedoms of western society. Most such organizations are of a social nature, choirs, clubs, charitable organizations, professionals and others, but there are organizations whose activities are in political fields.
What we know of the organization of the Roman Empire, is that it was a loose confederation of towns and regions, each acting as a kind of local autonomy, with its laws and customs, each with its relation to Rome and acting under its watchful eye. While each behaved according to their agreements and posed no danger to Rome, they were free to manage their internal affairs. This form of sharing authority exists today in all the countries of Western civilization. Each village, town and city has its own elected magistrates and by-laws, with more or less independence, provided it behaves within the limits imposed by central authority.
The range of those organizations can be very wide indeed. They are not only purely social clubs or municipal bodies. Guilds, trade organizations, workers unions, universities and religious orders are all voluntary organizations, created and maintained by their members and acting independently under legally binding internal rules and constitutions This is a specific Western concept, unmatched by any other civilization.10
There is a special form of voluntary organization, which had an extraordinary role in the history of the West. This was one or another type of armed formations, not under state control but with aims not opposed to the interests of the central authority. Judging from the spread of such organizations across the whole of Western history, they must have sprung from some very ancient Western root.
Their origin is hidden in the mists of history. We only know their names and not much more. The Sacred Band of Thebes was among the first, then the Mamertines who had a role in the Punic Wars, and the Jomsviking. Their existence lies somewhere between the border of myth and reality. But in later days, there were organizations, which certainly were no figments of imagination.
The fighting orders of the Spanish Reconquista, the Alcantara, Calatrava and Santiago, the Orders of the Crusaders, the Templars, Hospitalers, The Knights of Malta, were the vanguard of the Crusades, the Teutonic Knights were the spearhead of the German advance into the Baltic areas and Poland. Not every independent organization was religious. The Hanseatic League had no religious connections, nor were the ships of the Privateers who acted under letters of marquee issued by the states, nor the various mercenary armies of the condottieri.
Voluntary fighting organizations existed not only in olden times. They existed in relatively modern times too, when the state could not act for some reason or other. Garibaldi's Redshirts were one of them, so were the Freikorps in Germany after the first World War. They were active in fields in the interest of the state, but their independence allowed the states to disown them, if necessary. The main point of these organizations was that their members were volunteers. This point alone separated them from some Eastern organizations, like the Turkish Janissaries and the Egyptian Mamelukes, whose members were impressed slaves.
- State and religion are separate. Contrary to all popular wisdom, it was always so. It is possible that there were regimes that made use of religion for political purposes, but it was always done to make use of the Church and not its theological or ethical contents.
During the religious wars in Europe, the maxim cuius regio eius religio - the ruler of a territory determines its religion too - had nothing to do with theology and dogma. It meant competing political parties and ruling elite If each religion had its own political party then only one party, and ipso facto one religion only, could have the ascendancy.
However, to set the record straight, the rulers usually followed the majority of their subjects. When it was not so, the rulers acted accordingly. The case of Christina of Sweden illustrates the point.
Christina, the Queen of Sweden, the daughter of Gustaf Adolph turned into a Catholic. She did not claim the execution of the principle of 'cuius regio, eius religio' knowing full well that it could not have been enforced. So, she resigned and went to live in Rome.
This brings us to the last point in the Western principles of rule. It is the fact that there is always a possibility of opposition, and it was usually used. There were times, both in olden times and in recent history, when dissenting opinion was dangerous, heads rolled (or the opposition was shot by an executioner's pistol in a dark cellar), but there were still those who said no and were prepared to fight for their beliefs.
The existence of opposition, the right to say no, is not an opinion but is so in reality. Both Hitler and Stalin, to mention two recent examples, were in opposition at the beginning of their political careers. They were not the first. Even under the rule of the Roman Emperors, there was the opposition of the Stoics.
However, neither the Stoics, nor Hitler or Stalin, could bring the West to disallow dissenting opinions. It is so ingrained in Western political consciousness, that it is doubtful that the West would ever accept the proverb, which seemingly govern the East:
"It is better to have sixty years of tyranny than one day of anarchy,"
The concept of the rule of law, and the possibility of saying no, however dangerous at times, is really the basis of what is called today Western civilization.11
Search for Liberties
Environmental conditions created individualism in the West. It meant that each man was an individual, with his own values and deficiencies, with expectations to find a suitable niche in the fabric of society. That the expectations were usually inflated was stuff that literature was made of.
It is true that each individual attempted to reach for whatever he could, but even Western society put obstacles before people to prevent them achieving their full potential despite their capabilities alone. Birth, wealth, class distinctions, was devices to keep people in their place. Despite that, there are examples in every age and country of people reaching positions beyond their normal limits, based on talent alone. In each country and in each period, there were individual loopholes which talented people could exploit. In classical Greece and Rome, it was probably military achievement, Marius was the best example of that. In medieval Europe, it was the Church which provided ladders for talented people. Thomas Becket, the Chancellor of Henry I of England was perhaps one of the most famous examples, but there were countless others.
Despite exceptions, there were a number of restraints on the people of Europe, usually birth, class and wealth. This was in contrast to the Middle East, where only family connection set one's place in society.
It is probably the reason why social conflicts in Europe were always around liberties (rights), and never around liberty.12 The expression 'liberties' (rights) meant that every individual had the right to achieve whatever he could based on individual talent alone, provided that the individual belonged to a group which had that particular liberty and that it was done according to the rules of the game. Of course, the rules of the game are never equitable, they always favor some and disfavor others. On the face of it, in Western society today, everyone is equal with equal opportunities, It is a gentle lie, and concealing the fact that wealth can provide opportunities, which those without wealth cannot have. Still, Western society is more equitable and open than others.
It is possible that someone who received a better education because of his family's wealth will fill the post of a head of department in a major hospital. It is also possible that the best candidate will not fill it, but a qualified doctor will fill it. An illiterate moron will not fill it, just because he is a scion of an important family, near the seat of power. David Pryce-Jones tells in his book: The Closed Circle,13 the story of a young English doctor, Ian Young, who served in the early 1970's as a gynecologist in a hospital in the Kabyle district of Algeria. The sanitary and medical conditions in the hospital were terrible, so was the professional level of the staff.
Ian Young complained to the staff and then to the supervisor. However, the supervisor was not a doctor, but held the post as a reward for his services as a nursing orderly in the war of Liberation. At the young doctor's complaint, the supervisor's shame-honor system took over, he got hold of the doctor, shook him and shouted that he knew "all the pathology in the world, all surgery and gynecology". His knowledge was as limitless as his power. No hospital room was closed to him, no piece of paper was not his to do with as he wished. At the end, the English doctor was thrown out of the hospital and deported from Algeria. It is doubtful, that it could have happened in Europe.
The issue was always about liberties (rights) and not about liberty. Unlimited liberty, in the fullest sense of the word, was never allowed in the West. Nor anywhere else. Even in the most democratic early societies, like Athens, citizenship, together with the right to participate in the affairs of the polis, was the birthright of freeborn Athenian citizens and their descendants. There were times when proletarians, e.g. people not owning property, were excluded from full citizenship, so were aliens, living in Athens for generations, as were the children of Athenian fathers and non-Athenian mothers.14
So, freedom for all and general liberty were alien notions for most of human history. Whenever a statesman or a poet waxes eloquently about liberty, they always mean it for a group, a people even, but never as a universal concept.
Western history at all times was filled with social conflicts about liberties, e.g. about some special rights for a group of people, who might have had a common origin, but more often than not had common interests. It started in very early times. There might have been earlier occasions, but the best documented social conflict was in Corcyra - modern Corfu - at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides described that conflict in great detail.15 It is difficult to better Thucydides who described the utter hopelessness of the social strife and the deep feelings it caused:
"...Corcyra gave the first example of most of the crimes alluded to; the reprisals exacted by the governed who had never experienced equitable treatment or indeed aught but insolence from their rulers - when their hour came; of the iniquitous resolves of those who desired to get rid of their accustomed poverty, and ardently coveted their neighbors' goods, and lastly, of the savage and pitiless excesses into which men who had begun the struggle, not in a class but in a party spirit, were hurried by their ungovernable passions."16
It is difficult to add to these words. They could have been applied to every revolution since then, up to and including the revolutions of our own age.
Western history is a series of conflicts between groups of citizens for rights. They were always precipitated by one part of the citizenry wishing to receive additional rights to those they already had. Sometimes they demanded equality with those who already had predominance in the city or country, sometimes they demanded special rights to be given them instead of those who had them before. The distinction between the two types of demands was the relation between the powers of the groups, those of the ruling elite and those who wanted to join or replace them. Of course, there were also struggles when demands were made by those who had no rights, but wanted elementary human rights and personal freedom. Such were the innumerable slave insurrections and peasant uprisings.
The rich plebeian families who wanted to have a share in the government of Rome did not intend to replace the patricians. They wanted to have rights equal to the patricians. Eventually they achieved their aims. When the next social unrest came, at the time of Tiberius and Caius Gracchus, the rich plebeian families were already united in a common front with their previous opponents against those who now in their turn demanded a share.
Other social conflicts were much simpler. When the workers of the mint in Rome declared a strike, taken as a revolt by the authorities, the Emperor Aurelian had to stop his war against the Germans on the Danube and returned to Rome to quell the revolt. The workers in the mint did not ask for social privileges; they wanted better living conditions.17
Apart from the revolts of slaves, the coloni and the workers, the pattern of conflicts was always more or less the same. Those who demanded liberties, privileges in simple terms, either demanded equal privileges with those in power, or to replace them altogether.
In the French Revolution, the rich and powerful middle class replaced the aristocracy of the Ancien Regime, at the same time bloodily repressing the lower classes who wanted to have a share in power. The conflicts, which were to come in 1848 and 1871, had their roots in 1789.
Western history is one long series of conflicts between classes and castes. They haven't solved anything. The results were always temporary. The reason was that where society allows flexibility, social relations are flexible too. No country had a continuous history of the same governing elite for more than a few generations.
What caused Western societies to reach their present equilibrium is not the success of past social conflicts but the wealth of the West, which allows a more equitable distribution without the need to struggle for it.
Indeed, one of the major developments of the last two centuries of Western history is that the previous castes and social classes have all but disappeared, There are no more peasants, there are farmers. Soldiers and politicians are professionals like any other, with remuneration and social standing based upon supply and demand. 18 This development is a corollary to the wealth of Western civilization. It was pointed out in Tour de Horizon, that participation in the club of democratic, liberal states, has a high entrance fee. While the West continues to have the GNP recorded in Appendix II, the club dues will be fully paid, and western social conflicts will be of low intensity.
Scientific Curiosity
In modern times, e.g. since the destruction of the Western Roman Empire, the scientific and cultural lives of both Eastern and Western civilizations knew periods of flowering and decline.
Eastern civilization had a period of flowering from the beginning of the 7th Century AD, from the emergence of Islam to late medieval times, i.e. about the time of the Mongol invasion. The reason for the flowering was first the removal of the heavy hands of both the Christian and Zoroastrian churches from the intellectual life of the Middle East and last, but not least, the translation and assimilation into Arabic of the the combined knowledge of Classical Greece, Babylon, Persia, India and China.
The period of the decline of Eastern science started about the middle of the 13th Century AD There were two causes. First, the Islamic Empire was taken over by northern barbarians, just like in the Western Roman Empire. The northern barbarians, Seljuks, Mongols, Mamelukes and Ottomans had no interest in science. At the same time, Islamic dogma became more stringent and was, and still is, the main anti-science instrument of the East.
In the West, the process was identical but chronologically reversed. In the period corresponding to the flowering of science and culture in the East, there was a general decline in the West in everything, including science and culture. The reasons for this decline were identical to the decline of the East later on. Western Europe was taken over by illiterate northerners, who had no knowledge of and not much interest in science and culture. The Christian church emulated the later Islamic attitude in most respects. Classical science, with its roots in pagan antiquity, was un-Christian.
The scientific flowering of the West started in the eleventh-twelfth centuries AD There was general economic prosperity which showed itself in science too. Western universities were established, classical science and philosophy reached the West in Arabic translations, through contacts in Spain and the Levant. Christian dogma became less strict and more supportive.
When Arabic translations of Aristotle reached the West, the ideas presented a formidable challenge to Christian theology. 19 Still they were incorporated into the curricula of Western Universities. Indeed, the obstruction of the Christian church was more formidable in appearance than in reality. If people did not mix science with heresy, the Church usually closed at least one eye. Even in the famous case of 'eppur si muove' of Galileo Galilei the conflict was not with the Church but with the scientific establishment. The scientific establishment compelled the Church to intervene. There were Jesuit priests at that time who were studying astronomy based on the same principles as put forward by Galileo Galilei.
The science of the Far East had a different development. The direction was towards technology, applied rather than pure science. From the 1st Century BC until the 15th Century AD, there was an undoubted flowering of Chinese technology.20 The results of that flowering, paper, gunpowder, magnetism and others, reached the West through the East. So did Indian scientific developments as well.21
Since that time there is an undoubted Western domination in all-scientific matters. It is so obvious that any attempt justifying this statement would be superfluous.22 Western science today is ubiquitous, pervasive and all embracing. If one looks at the subjects taught today in Western universities, they contain practically every possible scientific subject on earth. It seems that it is a matter of curiosity and not utilitarian needs. Edward Said accused the West that it uses the discipline of Orientalism as a means of penetrating the East, and the absence of corresponding Occidentalism in the East as a virtue.23 The plain fact remains that Westerners have an innate curiosity in all subjects, from the Orient to the mating habits of the spotted owl. It is only luck that nobody has put in a complaint in the name of the spotted owl.
It is possible that in modern times, there is Western science and there is no Eastern science, for legal and organizational reasons, and religious obstruction, 24 but it does not explain that the same Western curiosity and the same Eastern apathy existed before Islam and before Christianity.
It was said here that in the Middle East there were states built upon 'hydraulic civilizations' , e.g.large-scale state-run irrigation projects, which fed the population and enslaved them as return payment. The ruling elite of these states were not interested, then or now, to better the lives of their subjects. They had no interest in science and technological development, apart from a few subjects connected with geometry and astronomy. They might have been interested in better weaponry, but even this subject was handed out to others.
Such remains to this very day. Hungarians cast the guns the Ottoman armies used in the siege of Constantinople to batter down the walls. Christian renegades, who were paid well, brought most technological applications to the East. The same applies to the present as well.No Islamic state has sufficient technological and scientific infrastructure to create advanced weaponry, equivalent to the guns cast by Urban, the Hungarian, so machines, materials and know-how are purchased from western firms or western scientists. Instead of Urban the Hungarian today they bought Bull, the Canadian with his supergun.
If it is so today and it was so 2,500 - 3,000 years ago, there must be some reason for it. If we take the development of iron weapons, one can accept that Greek smiths on the Ionian islands experimented to manufacture better bronze and better steel. But this was worthwhile financially. It is much more difficult to explain the constant pre-occupation of the Greeks with questions of philosophy and general knowledge.
From the 7th Century BC, there was an outburst of Greek philosophic thought. There were Greek scholars, first from the Greek cities on the Asian mainland, scholars such as Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Leucippus and others, and then Pythagoras. They first came from Samos and then from Croton in South Italy. From the mainland came Socrates, Democritos, Plato and Aristotle. 25 There were many more, here only the most important are mentioned.
Here was something out of the ordinary, at least something special in the history of mankind. What has happened in the East, was regrettable but understandable. One can understand the lack of interest of the ruling elite in the East to extend the limits of knowledge. So one can accept that Egyptians and Babylonians did not travel to the Greek cities to absorb knowledge. They were part of the elite, and had no intention of breaching ranks.
The conduct of the East and the easterners was understandable, that of the West was very special and very unique. The curiosity of the Greeks had no bounds. Herodotus went to Egypt to see for himself, remarked on what he saw and wrote it down so that his countrymen, who were just as curious as he was, should learn from his writings.
Thales went to Phoenicia and also to Egypt, where he taught the Egyptians how to measure the height of the pyramid by its shadow, by comparing it with the ratio of a man with his shadow. Diogenes (I. 24, 27) tells this anecdote, which if true, shows that Egyptian geometry must have been in a very sorry state, if they did not know this elementary equation. It makes one wonder how they built the pyramids without knowing elementary geometry?
It seems that while Western interest in science is unique, it is nevertheless a natural phenomenon. It is difficult to assert that of all the civilizations which originated after the introduction of agriculture, only the direction of Western civilization is natural, and that of the Eastern, Indic and Confucian civilizations are not. However, all those civilization were based upon irrigation, with its well-known consequences. Western civilization alone had the luck to evade this.
As the case of Western civilization is unique, it is difficult to prove the hypothesis that might explain the roots of Western curiosity. Nonetheless, it is probably the only correct explanation.
Each child when growing up has to learn about the surrounding world. The child usually learns from examples, conscious teaching and play. Play is an important method of teaching children. The Greeks, in the first half of the First Millennium BC, were on the threshold of life. It is difficult even to imagine what a man like Thales of Miletus might have known about his world, his people and its history. He might have known something about the migrations, but he certainly could not draw upon accumulated knowledge about the world. He may have known Homer and Hesiod well, but these were not much help.
When Thales and the others wished to understand the world they were living in, they could only ask other and older peoples about their knowledge. So they went to Egypt, to Babylon, Phoenicia and other places. Seemingly, they were not satisfied with the answers, so they did what every child would. They wove tales about the world, the seas, the heaven and the stars. Some of the tales were more logical than others. In their favor it must be said that they were not fanatical about their theories. Everything was debatable and it was debated.
It is difficult to compare Plato's Academy and Aristotle's Lyceum to a kindergarten, but in fact they were. We only have to look today at the scientific basis of each university subject. In the Universities today very little new knowledge is created; people draw upon accumulated knowledge with its depth of innumerable layers. Sometimes, very seldom, the combination of past knowledge, human ingenuity and fortuitous circumstances create some element of new knowledge. At the time of Thales, Pythagoras and Democritus, the existing basis of knowledge was next to nothing. They had to fill the void and they did it by pure reasoning.
This hypothesis assumes that children's play is a common human trait. If so, why did the other civilizations not go the same way? It seems that those who might have had the freedom to act, had no interest in doing so, and those who might have had that interest, were occupied in forced labor. Only Thales, Pythagoras, Aristoteles and countless others who came after them, had the freedom, the curiosity, some sort of livelihood and the ability
.
Notes:
| 1. |
Samuel P. Huntington, "The West: Unique , not Universal",
(Foreign Affairs, 11 - 12 /1996), p.28ff
, The clash of civilization, op. cit. pp. 69 - 70
|
| 2. |
Idem, p.301 quotes Matthew Melko,"The nature of civilizations",
(Boston,Peter Sargent,1969),p.155
.
|
| 3. |
Gordon Childe, What happened in history, op. cit. p.169
Prehistory , op. cit. pp. 15 , 43 , 81, 98 - 99
|
| 4. |
Jared Diamond, op. cit. p.410
|
| 5. |
Fletcher Pratt, op. cit. pp. 18 - 19
See also Ibn Khaldun,op. cit.p.227
|
| 6. |
Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean, op. cit. Vol.I.pp.74 - 75
|
| 7. |
Colin Renfrew, op. cit. p.253
|
| 8. |
Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean, op. cit. Vol.I. p.243
|
| 9. |
Fernand Braudel, A History of Civilization, op. cit. pp. 11 - 12
|
| 10. |
Toby E. Huff, op. cit. p.81
|
| 11. |
Pierre Grimal, "On les appelait les barbares",
(Historia Special, Novembre 1990), pp.13 - 14
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash, op. cit. p.311
Fernand Braudel, A History of Civilization, op. cit. pp. 314 - 315
Henri Frankfort, Birth of Civilization, op. cit. p.8 quoted Herodotus II. 35
about the uniqueness of civilizations.
|
|
| 12. |
Fernand Braudel, A History of Civilizations, op. cit. pp.315 - 316
|
| 13. |
David Pryce-Jones op. cit.pp.53-54 quotes from
Ian Young, "The private life of Islam",(London,Allen Young,1974),p.50
|
| 14. |
C. Hignett, "A history of the Athenian Constitution to the end of the
Fifth Century B.C."
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1970) ,pp. 343 - 347
|
| 15. |
Thucydides, "The Peloponesian War", (Modern Library , New York, 1951)
Chapter X. 70 - 86
|
| 16. |
Idem, X. 84
|
| 17. |
D .F. Buck, "The reign of Aurelian in Eunapius' Histories",
(University of Prince Edward Island, Volume 9.2., 1995),p..86
|
| 18. |
Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty, op. cit. p.76
|
| 19. |
Toby E. Huff, op. cit., p.231
|
| 20. |
Idem, pp.237 - 238
|
| 21. |
Idem, p.187
|
| 22. |
Ibn Khaldun, op. cit. pp. 373 - 375
Jared Diamond, op. cit. pp. 409 - 410
|
| 23. |
Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West, op. cit. pp. 123 - 125
|
| 24. |
Toby E. Huff, op. cit. pp. 134 - 135
|
| 25. |
Michael Fowler, "Early Greek Science: Thales to Plato",
(lecture - University of Virginia, 1997) p. 1ff
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|
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